Muhammad Ahmad Zafar | 30th December 2024 | www.aagahi.com
“When he was informed by Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah on 19th July 1947 that he was not acceptable to Pakistan as a common Governor General, he flew into a rage.
Mountbatten: ‘Do you realize what it will cost you?’
Jinnah: ‘May be a few crore of rupees in assets.’
Mountbatten: ‘No, it may cost you all the assets and Pakistan.’”
[Witness to Blunder by Col Ashfaq Hussain, 40]
“Mr Attlee the Prime Minister of Britain had already opined, ‘Pakistan is an unworkable proposition.’”
[Witness to Blunder by Col Ashfaq Hussain, 40]
“I find no parallel in history for a body of converts and their descendants claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock ...”
[Witness to Blunder, 40-41]
“Beyond NJ9842, vague language identifying the CFL as ‘thence north to the glaciers,’ was used.”
“Atlases reflecting Pakistan’s version of the LOC were produced in the USA and UK by National Geograhic and by Encyclopedia Britannica (1979) ... Even US agency maps showed Siachen as part of Pakistan.”
[From Kargil to the Coup, 33]
“As Director-General Military Operations, Musharraf under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had war-gamed a Kargil like situation in which Pakistan would have militarily taken Kashmir. Musharraf himself recalled only that he had told the prime minister, ‘The time window for the resolution of Kashmir dispute is short because with the passage of time the India-Pakistan equation, military equation and the economic equation is going against us ...’”
[From Kargil to the Coup, 92]
“... was planned by Generals Pervez Musharraf, then the Chief of the Army Staff, with Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed, then the Corp Commander of the 11 Division based in Rawalpindi along with Lieutenant General Aziz Khan (b. 1947).”
“The officer who executed it was Major General Javed Hassan, the Field Commander Northern Area (FCNA) whose troops actually fought the war.”
[Pakistan’s Wars by Tariq Rahman, 271]
“Vajpayee wrote in the visitors’ book, ‘From the Minar-i-Pakistan, I want to assure the people of Pakistan of my country’s deep desire for lasting peace and friendship. I have said and I say this again, a stable and prosperous Pakistan is in India’s favour. Let there be no doubt about this.”
“Vajpayee also pointedly tackled the question of Akhand Bharat. Speaking at the Governor’s House, he said, ‘Yes, we did not want the break-up of our country; its division created a wound, but the wound has now healed. Yet the scar remains and keeps reminding us of how we should live with each other, in peace and as friends.’”
[From Kargil to the Coup, 127]
“It was on 19 March, during the SAARC foreign minister's retreat in Norellia at the Sri Lankan President’s summer home, that, after a long walk together in a huge garden with two lotus lakes, Jaswant Singh of India and Sartaj Aziz of Pakistan sat down on a bench for a ninety-minute talk.”
“The two foreign ministers agreed that it was not realistic to expect that one party would move ninety percent from its original position and the other only ten percent. It was necessary that a mid-point be found where the two sides could meet.”
[From Kargil to the Coup, 136-137]
مجھے ایک فوجی ملا، سینئر بندا ، 17 مئی کی بریفنگ کے بعد۔ میں نے کہا، ”کیا assessment ہے، کیا ہو رہا ہے“
کہتا ہے، ”سیر! یا کورٹ مارشل ہوگا یا مارشل لاء ہوگا “
“The army chief arrived at the PM House within an hour. There were only three people present at the time of this crucial moment of the Kargil crisis: the PM, Defense Secretary, and the army chief. The PM asked Musharraf, ‘Did you cross the LOC?’ Musharraf responded, ‘Yes, sir, I did.’ ‘And on whose authority?’ queried the prime minister. The army chief was quick to respond, ‘On my own responsibility and if you now order, sir, I will order the troops withdrawal.’ Nawaz Sharif turned to his Defense Secretary and said, ‘Did you see? He has accepted his responsibility!’ Sharif, perhaps visualizing himself as the ‘liberator’ of Kashmir, added, ‘Since the army is part of the government, from today onwards we will support the army.’”
[From Kargil to the Coup, 167]
“From mid-June onwards, Pakistan’s Deputy Chief of Mission Jalil Abbas Jillani, whenever asked by his hosts to collect the bodies of Pakistani soldiers, would decline, saying these were not our boys. Resentfully, the Pakistani soldiers would watch the televised Muslim burial of the disowned bodies of their martyred comrades, conducted by the Indians with full honours and bodies wrapped in a Pakistani flag.”
[From Kargil to the Coup, 222]
“The public critique later by one of Pakistan’s most professional generals, Lt. General Ali Quli Khan, best captured the views of Pakistan’s top commanders. Commenting on General Musharraf’s own conclusion on the Kargil Operations, ‘Considered in purely military terms, the Kargil Operations were a landmark in the history of the Pakistan Army,’ Khan, the former Chief of General Staff wrote, ‘I am totally amazed at such ostrich-like behaviour when the whole world considers Kargil to be the worst debacle in Pakistan’s history and where countless innocent young lives were lost for nothing. Absolutely nothing!’”
[From Kargil to the Coup, 358]
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